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The perspective of new global crisis?
The world economy and, in particular, Europe, seems
to enter the new phase of serious macroeconomic and
financial turbulences which, most likely, will result in
an output slowdown. It remains to be seen whether
this slowdown1 will evolve towards a second ‘dip’ sim-
ilar to that of the second half of 2008 and first half of
2009. Very much depends on the right diagnosis of the
current troubles and right therapy. 
Unfortunately, the public discussion on both causes of
the crisis and potential remedies are sometimes mis-
leading and overdramatize policy choices which does
not help in taking right decisions. It is driven by short-
term interests of financial market participants who
want to minimize their potential losses and look for
another generous bailout at the expense of taxpayers,
media hunt for breaking news, and politicians wanti-
ng to remain on the top of events and be heard by the
media. 
In addition, most governments are reluctant to adopt
sufficient long-term corrective measures, which may
involve high political costs in the short run. As the cri-
sis is currently centered on the euro area and
European Union the reforms shall also involve some
changes in the EU/EMU institutional design, includ-
ing, additional transfer of political power from a
national to Union’s level. This makes things even
more complicated as the issue of national sovereignty
remains sensitive in several EU member states. On top
of this, there is no intellectual consensus on both cri-
sis origins (a common currency project vs. unsustain-
able fiscal policies) and optimal design of fiscal and
macroeconomic management within the single cur-
rency area. 
Many analysts and commentators speak about the
euro crisis but this is not a right diagnosis, at least not
yet. A currency crisis can be defined as a sudden
decline in confidence in a given currency, leading to a
speculative attack against it and resulting in its sub-
stantial depreciation. Nothing like this has happened
with the euro so far. Instead we observe a sovereign
debt crisis in a number of eurozone countries and
beyond. However, it may happen that wrong diagno-
sis and therapy may undermine, at some point, the
credibility of the euro as the currency. We will return
to this question later in this paper. 
Fiscal crisis in advanced economies
In 2010 and 2011 the attention of public opinion and
analysts concentrated on the fiscal problems of the
so-called eurozone periphery – Greece, Ireland and
Portugal, more recently on Italy and Spain. However,
as can be seen from Table 1, dramatic increase in pub-
lic debt to GDP ratio was recorded in most EU mem-
ber states and other major developed economies. 
In 2010, according to the IMF WEO statistics, the
gross public debt of 12 out of 17 members of the
Economic and Monetary Union (all but Estonia,
Finland, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia)
exceeded a ‘Maastricht’ limit of 60 percent GDP,
and the same situation concerned 2 non-EMU
members of the EU (Hungary and Britain). The
threshold of 80 percent was exceeded by 8 EU mem-
ber states: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ire  land, Italy, and Portugal. Looking at
these numbers, the popular perception that euro-
zone is divided between the fiscally prudent ‘North’
and imprudent ‘South’ looks questionable. Actually,
the debt-to-GDP level of Germany and France is
not much lower than that of Portugal and much
higher compared to Spain. As a result of fiscal dete-
rioration in the largest member states the entire EU
debt reached a level close to 80 percent of its GDP
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and the eurozone – above 85 percent. Outside the
EU situation looks even worse with the US gross
public debt approaching quickly the level of
100 percent of GDP and Japan’s – well above the
level of 200 percent. 
The debt dynamics have been even more worrying:
during the crisis period (2007–2010) the global gross
public debt to GDP ratio (including developing coun-
tries which perform much better) increased by
17.2 percentage points of GDP. The EU recorded an
increase by 20.3 percentage points and the eurozone –
by 19.4 percentage points. 
The short-term perspective does
not look rosy either. According to
the IMF forecast of September
2011 in all highly indebted coun-
tries except Belgium, Germany
and Hungary the situation is going
to deteriorate further in 2011–2012
and one must remember that this
forecast has been built on relative-
ly optimistic growth assumptions
which, most probably, will have to
be revised down. 
Summing up, as seen in De  cember
2011 the current macroeconomic
and financial turmoil has been
caused by a widespread fiscal crisis
which affected most of the devel-
oped world and the largest
economies such as Japan, United
States, Italy, France, Germany,
Canada and Britain. Contrary to
popular perception this is not the
phenomenon limited to the euro-
zone periphery and to the euro-
zone itself. The only factor which
is specific to the EMU concerns
uncertainty of the debt resolution
mechanism, i.e. how the burden of
debt restructuring will be eventual-
ly shared between the country
affected by the debt crisis and their
single currency partners and which
part of this burden will have to be
absorbed by private creditors. 
However, the above uncertainty
has not resulted from the Treaty
itself. The Article 125 of the
Treaty of the Functioning of the
European Union is quite clear in this respect: it pro-
hibits any direct bailout of member states. Rather it has
been the effect of an ad hoc policy of providing the EU
member states in trouble with partial rescue packages
(very often against the no-bailing-out principle), con-
ducted under the pressure of financial markets to avoid
their panic and broader contagion effect. 
Why financial markets became so nervous?
The recent change in attitude of financial markets to
sovereign debt solvency of many developed countries
Table 1  
General government gross debt-to-GDP ratio in EU 
and other developed countries, 2007–2012 
Country  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  2012 
World  62.1 65.2 75.6 79.3 79.6  80.0 
EU  59.5 63.9 74.3 79.8 82.3  83.7 
EMU members 
Eurozone  66.4 70.1 79.7 85.8 88.6  90.0 
Austria  60.7 63.8 69.6 72.2 72.3  73.9 
Belgium  84.2 89.6 96.2 96.7 94.6  94.3 
Cyprus  58.3 48.3 58.0 60.8 64.0  66.4 
Estonia 3.7  4.6  7.2  6.6  6.0  5.6 
Finland  35.2 33.9 43.3 48.4 50.2  50.3 
France  64.2 68.2 79.0 82.3 86.8  89.4 
Germany  65.0 66.4 74.1 84.0 82.6  81.9 
Greece  105.4 110.7 127.1 142.8 165.6  189.1 
Ireland  24.9 44.4 65.2 94.9  109.3  115.4 
Italy  103.6 106.3 116.1 119.0 121.1  121.4 
Luxembourg  6.7 13.6 14.6 18.4 19.7  21.5 
Malta 61.8  61.3  67.3  67.1  66.3  66.1 
Netherlands  45.3 58.2 60.8 63.7 65.5  66.5 
Portugal 68.3  71.6  83.0  92.9  106.0  111.8 
Slovakia  29.6 27.8 35.4 41.8 44.9  46.9 
Slovenia  23.4 22.5 35.5 37.3 43.6  47.2 
Spain  36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1 67.4  70.2 
Non-EMU EU members 
Bulgaria  18.6 15.5 15.6 17.4 17.8  20.5 
Czech Republic  29.0  30.0  35.4  38.5  41.1  43.2 
Denmark  34.1 42.2 41.8 43.7 44.3  45.8 
Hungary  66.1 72.3 78.4 80.2 76.1  75.5 
Latvia  7.8 17.1 32.8 39.9 39.6  40.5 
Lithuania  16.9 15.6 29.6 38.7 42.8  44.6 
Poland 45.0  47.1  50.9  55.0  56.0  56.4 
Romania  12.7 13.6 23.9 31.7 34.4  34.4 
Sweden  40.2 38.8 42.8 39.7 36.0  32.6 
UK  43.9 52.0 68.3 75.5 80.8  84.8 
Other developed countries 
Canada  66.5 71.1 83.3 84.0 84.1  84.2 
Japan  187.7 195.0 216.3 220.0 233.1  238.4 
US  62.3 71.6 85.2 94.4  100.0  105.0 
Note: blue fields indicate IMF estimates/forecasts. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database,  
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results mostly from the rapidly changing global
macroeconomic and financial environment. In the
pre-crisis period of relatively high economic growth
and abundance of cheap finance originating from the
surplus savings in Asia and in oil-producing countries
lending to governments look relatively safe and
attractive. Most countries recorded either gradual
decrease or at least stabilization of their debt-to-GDP
levels. 
The rapid deterioration of the global public debt to
GDP level and perspective of slower GDP growth in
a medium term means that financing becomes rela-
tively more expensive and difficult to obtain. There is
an increasing global competition for scarce financial
resources both between private and public sectors (the
former being crowded out by the latter) and within the
public sector itself. Countries with uncertain macro-
economic and fiscal perspectives are losing to those
with a more solid credit reputation. However even
those who were considered by financial markets as
safe havens not so long time ago have now a good rea-
sons to fear about their credit ratings and debt sus-
tainability perspective. With low growth or no growth
in the next few years their debt-to-GDP level will con-
tinue to grow rapidly putting their debt solvency per-
spective under question. As a result, the perception of
the ‘safe’ debt level (or the threshold of debt intoler-
ance – see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) is changing
rapidly leading to massive sovereign rating down-
grades and capital outflows from public debt market
of individual countries. 
This has also an impact on the debt sustainability per-
spective within the EU and eurozone. In the pre-crisis
environment investors might expect that in case of
isolated debt service problems, faced by countries with
the highest debt-to-GDP ratios like Greece, other
EU/EMU members will have enough fiscal room to
provide them a rescue package (even if such expecta-
tions went against the Article 125 of the TFEU). Now
when most of EU countries, including France,
Germany and Britain face serious fiscal challenges
themselves and there are more candidates for actual
or potential rescue this kind of assumption is not jus-
tified anymore. 
The additional constraints come from continuous
financial deleverage in many countries (as result of
bursting bubbles in 2007–2008) and from the regula-
tory reform in the banking sector (especially increas-
ing capital adequacy ratios and liquidity require-
ments) which make lending more scarce and expen-
sive, other things being equal. If the idea of new
banking or financial transactions tax materializes it
will add to lending costs even more and will further
slow economic growth. 
Causes of the sovereign debt crisis
Which factors led to such unprecedented deteriora-
tion of fiscal accounts in most of developed coun-
tries? The recession of 2008–2009, high costs of finan-
cial sector rescue and resulting high budget deficits
played, of course, an important role. However, the
negative fiscal trends in all major economies started
earlier – either at the beginning of 2000s (the United
States and most of the EU) or in 1990s (Japan). In
case of the United States these were the costs of the
war on terror and generous tax incentives aimed to
overcome consequences of the dotcom recession in
2001. In case of Japan this was the effect of long stag-
nation in 1990s, subsequent unsuccessful attempts to
reactivate the economy through aggressive fiscal stim-
ulus and costs of banks restructuring after the 1990
financial crisis. Finally, in the EU this was a combina-
tion of the slowdown (similar to that of the United
States) and relaxation of fiscal discipline in early
2000s. 
During the boom years of 2003–2007 policymakers
were overoptimistic about the long-term potential
growth of their economies and largely forgot about
adverse fiscal consequences of forthcoming popula-
tion aging. They were also misled by the unexpected-
ly high revenue elasticity of this particular business
cycle. In the boom years budget revenue in several
countries grew much faster than nominal GDP, a
trend which was then abruptly reversed when the
2008–2009 recession started. The nature of these
wind  fall revenues requires a more in-depth analysis. 
In the wake of 2007–2009 crisis the costs of financial
sector rescue have been largely underestimated and
potential of a countercyclical fiscal policy – overesti-
mated. These are the important lessons for the future. 
In the globalized economy any fiscal stimulus has ten-
dency to ‘leak’ outside a given economy.2 The cross-
border coordination of fiscal stimuli, even within the
EU, proves problematic for many reasons (see
Dabrowski 2010). In addition, in the environment of
2 Unless it is accompanied by protectionist measures. Fortunately,
the incidence of protectionist measures during the 2008–2009 reces-
sion was limited, especially within the EU. CESifo Forum 4/2011 33
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excessive private and public indebtedness economic
agents prefer to increase their net saving rather than
spend more. As a result, the potential spending multi-
pliers have been smaller than experienced in the previ-
ous business cycles. 
More generally, the recent business cycle experience
gives a good food for thought about limited practical
usefulness of such traditional concepts as the poten-
tial output and cyclically adjusted fiscal balance (dif-
ficult to be estimated ex ante when the business cycle
is irregular), internationally agreed definitions of
public debt (which do not include unfunded liabilities
of the public pension and healthcare systems, and
contingent liabilities in the financial sector) or even
such popular measure as the debt-to-GDP ratio which
tell very little about country’s long-term fiscal sustain-
ability, especially in good times. 
If one analyzes the political economy dimension of
the discretionary fiscal policy, its asymmetrical
potential becomes very clear. It is politically easy to
provide fiscal stimulus but it is much more difficult
to withdraw it. The US experience with tax incen-
tives of the Bush era or the 2008–2009 stimulus
package, both intended to be only temporary, are
very telling here. 
The on-going financial sector reform must aim,
among many other things, at diminishing future con-
tingent fiscal liabilities. One of the key issues here is
addressing a ‘too big to fail’ problem, i.e. decreasing
the market share and political bargaining power of
the so-called systemically important financial institu-
tions (SIFI). The reform should also decrease pro-
cyclicality of financial sector regulations. 
The remedies which will not work
When the 2008–2009 recession started, many ana-
lysts and policymakers, especially those who pre-
ferred active countercyclical fiscal policies (actually
there was no fiscal room for such policies as we dis-
cussed in the previous section), believed in gradual
growing out of the debt when the economic situation
improves. However, in spite of relatively fast recov-
ery since the mid 2009 it did not happen. And this is
not a realistic perspective in the foreseeable future. In
the second half of 2011 most of developed eco  -
nomies, and Western Europe in particular, entered
the period of a new slowdown, perhaps leading to a
new recession in 2012. 
Even if the current slowdown/recession will be short-
living, the economic growth will not come back to the
pace of 1990s or mid-2000s. First, as mentioned
before, financial deleveraging and financial sector
reform will negatively influence growth potential for
quite a long time. Second, there are no new substan-
tial growth impulses similar to those which happened
in 1990s (peace dividend after the end of ‘Cold’ war,
economic opening of China, India and the former
communist countries, global trade liberalization, ICT
revolution). Third, both monetary and fiscal policies
which stimulated growth in the mid-2000s will have to
be more restrictive now. 
Another strategy, i.e., inflating out debt may work
only to a limited extent (until financial markets start
to charge an inflation-related risk premium) and in
those countries which do not have substantial debt
denominated in foreign currency.3 However, the nega-
tive side effects of such a policy – higher inflationary
expectations, building up inflationary inertia,
price/wage indexation practices and lower central
bank credibility – may be serious, long lasting and
devastating for both growth perspective and financial
stability. 
In case of the eurozone it may involve the additional
risk of undermining cross-country political consensus
around a common currency. Countries less burdened
with a public debt and more committed to price sta-
bility may consider paying an inflationary price for
inflating out others’ debts as economically and politi-
cally unacceptable. And they may decide to leave the
monetary union even if it involves undermining their
export competitiveness (because the new currency of
the leaving country will probably appreciate vis-a-vis
the euro). 
The opposite case when the country experiencing debt
crisis (like Greece) would like to leave and reintroduce
its own (weaker) national currency seems highly
unlikely because all its outstanding private and public
liabilities would remain denominated in euros.
Therefore, exiting the euro would mean an immediate
default on both public and most private debt, caused
by soaring debt-to-GDP ratios. In today’s sophisticat-
ed and interdependent economies, devaluation is not
so obvious medicine as one would have believed thir-
ty years ago in case of developing countries. Further  -
more, such an exit could not happen technically
3 Depreciation of domestic currency which may result from a pro-
inflationary policy will increase the debt service burden in both nom-
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overnight and the very first steps in this direction
would already trigger total financial chaos and loss of
market confidence not only in an exiting country. 
This should be remembered by those who use a threat
of kicking out trouble countries from the eurozone as
the pressure instrument to discipline them. Such a
rhetoric may have unintended and devastating conse-
quences in the form of, for example, panic withdraw-
al of banking deposits, capital flight, etc.
ECB as the ‘lender of last resort’ to governments 
The high costs of leaving the common currency area
for any single member country makes the EMU pro-
ject more sustainable than its critics and forecasters of
its quick demise would like to see. Nevertheless, there
are limits of this sustainability. As discussed above,
failure of the European Central Bank (ECB) to keep
inflation low and euro stable can bring us closer to
these limits. This should be taken into consideration
by those who advise the ECB to declare unlimited and
unconditional purchase of debt instruments issued by
the eurozone governments in case of market distress
(see e.g. Bofinger and Soros 2011).
The idea that the ECB may serve as the ‘lender of last
resort’ (LOLR) to governments is deeply flawed and
based on doubtful theoretical foundations. Central
banks can play such a role in respect to commercial
banks supplying them with temporary liquidity to
avoid depositors panic.4 In practice, it is often difficult
to distinguish bank’s illiquidity from its insolvency
(see Goodhart 1987). This is even more true in case of
a sovereign debt where market perception of govern-
ment’s solvency is conditional on various ex ante
assumptions hardly verifiable and subject of multiple
equilibria. 
Thus calling the ECB to play the role of LOLR on the
sovereign debt market means no less than asking this
institution to monetize government debt and print
money without limits.5 This may be the shortest path
from the debt crisis Europe is facing now to the gen-
uine euro crisis and collapse of the common currency
project. 
As for the other forms of bailout, wide-scale ECB’s
interventions can bring yields on treasury bonds
down and improve financial markets’ mood for a
while. However, apart from their inflationary conse-
quences and undermining ECB’s credibility they will
create wrong incentives for private investors and
encourage moral hazard. The investors who did not
hesitate to accept higher risk in exchange for higher
yields would receive risk insurance for free. 
The solutions which may work
Since the previously discussed remedies are either
unrealistic (growing out of debt) or counterproduc-
tive (inflationary scenario and ECB involvement) one
should consider two other options: fiscal adjustment
backed by microeconomic and institutional reforms
and debt restructuring. Both are politically and
socially painful and both involve substantial negative
side effects. However, only these two options offer
durable solutions. 
Fiscal adjustment, by its nature, addresses the core
roots of debt crisis, i.e. allows improving primary fis-
cal balance and decrease debt service costs. If concen-
trated on spending reduction rather than on rising
taxes and backed by well-designed microeconomic
and institutional reforms (for example, rationalizing
welfare programs and increasing elasticity of labour
market) they may increase a country’s growth poten-
tial in a medium-to-long run. However, the short-term
output and employment costs (and therefore addi-
tional negative fiscal shock) are hardly avoidable. 
Furthermore, as other developed economies must do
the same, one may expect slower global growth in a
short term. No substantial demand support can be
expected from emerging markets because most of
them will have to struggle with their macroeconomic
overheating. 
In some cases like Greece the debt burden is so high
that fiscal consolidation although necessary is not suf-
ficient to return the country’s solvency. This is why
debt restructuring must be also considered as the part
of adjustment package. Obviously, this is a costly
solution for lenders and involves other negative side-
effects. For example, it may trigger a cross-border
contagion on sovereign debt market and in the entire
4 This is the consequence of fractional reserve banking system with
less than 100-percent reserve requirement and with its imminent mis-
match between long-term assets and short-term liabilities.
5 The frequent references to quantitative easing (QE) operations con-
ducted by the US Federal Reserve Board, Bank of Japan or Bank of
England are incorrect for at least two reasons. First, the above banks
purchase government bonds on secondary market (apart from other
kinds of financial assets) within the quantitative limits set from the
point of view of monetary policy goals. These purchases are neither
unlimited nor unconditional. Second, the ECB has also conducted
QE operations increasing its monetary base when it has considered
necessary from the monetary policy point of view.CESifo Forum 4/2011 35
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financial sector. However, it is sometimes unavoidable.
The sooner it is done in an orderly fashion (i.e.,
through negotiations of all interested parties) the
eventual cost of debt restructuring will be smaller.
Excluding this option up front, as some governments
try to do, is neither realistic nor creating right incen-
tives for both creditors and borrowers. And negotiat-
ed debt restructuring or even unilaterally declared
(‘messy’) sovereign default of any eurozone country
does not mean breaking up the common currency
area. Economic history gives us several examples of
sovereign defaults under the gold standard (see
Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) or in individual US states
(see Gros 2010) which caused neither monetary nor
political disintegration.
What kind of fiscal union?
Part of the discussion concerns the reform of EU
institutions to increase Union’s capacity to deal with
the current crisis and minimize danger of its repeti-
tion in future. In this context many speak about the
necessity to complement the EMU with the fiscal
union. However, less clear is what such a fiscal union
means in practice.
Definitely, the EMU needs more fiscal discipline on
the national level6 to minimize the risk of free riding
under the umbrella of common currency which has
been one of the principal causes of the current crisis.
However, fiscal trouble of non-eurozone EU members
will also have negative repercussions for both the
Union and outside world. Hence, fiscal stability and
prudence should be considered as an important
European public good and apply equally to all EU
members regardless whether they are part of the euro-
zone or not.
In this context the effort to strengthen fiscal surveil-
lance rules in the Treaty and Stability and Growth
Pact and reinforce their both ‘preventive’ and ‘correc-
tive’ arms (including automatic and meaningful sanc-
tions) are going in the right direction. The same can
be said about attempts to push member states towards
enhancing their national fiscal rules and institutions
either through constitutional changes or equivalent
legislation. 
Another step towards strengthening EU fiscal feder-
alism involves building a permanent debt resolution
mechanism on the EU level the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) which will replace the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the temporary
mechanism established in May 2010. The ESM is to
start its operations in mid-2012. 
Ideally, the permanent resolution mechanism should
correctly balance punishment for past irresponsible
behavior (including the orderly sovereign default/re  -
structuring mechanism), incentives to correct past
mistakes and elements of financial aid to smooth the
painful adjustment process. It should also relieve the
European Central Bank from its current engagement
in assisting countries in trouble. It remains to be seen
whether the ESM will meet these expectations. 
Regretfully, not all proposals go towards strengthen-
ing fiscal discipline and eliminating moral hazard
and free riding. This refers to the idea of Euro  -
bonds,7 which are to be jointly issued/guaranteed by
the EMU members. They can lead to weakening fis-
cal discipline on national level and creating adverse
incentives rather than serving fiscal consolidation
and avoiding moral hazard. The practice of fiscal
federalism in many countries gives an evidence of
negative consequences of sharing responsibility for
the debt of subnational governments with fed  -
eral/national authorities. 
Some other ‘federalist’ ideas are interesting but do
not necessarily address the challenge created by the
sovereign debt crisis. The proposal of harmonizing
tax bases and (more controversially) tax rates across
the EU should be discussed in the context of func-
tioning of the Single European Market rather than
crisis prevention and resolution. The same relates to
the proposal that in future the EU budget should be
higher than the current 1 percent of Union’s GDP.
Perhaps it does, but this depends on which addition-
al policy tasks and responsibilities could be trans-
ferred from the national to the EU level and whether
such a transfer would offer bigger efficiency in their
implementation. 
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